The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is a bedrock for project valuation and is widely used for investment decisions (see Rubinstein, 1973; Copeland and Weston, 1988; Damodaran, 1999; Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe, 1999; Brealey and Myers, 2000, Fernández, 2002) . Arbitrage choice theory as well is a fundamental tool for valuing risky projects (see Nau and McCardle, 1991; Smith and Nau, 1995) . The principle of arbitrage is a cornerstone in financial economics (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Black and Scholes, 1973; Varian, 1987) , and is equivalent to the notion of "Pareto optimality" (Nau, 2004) and to noncooperative game theory (Nau and McCardle, 1990) . Recently, it has been shown that this principle is the fundamental principle of economic rationality, unifying theories of subjective probability, expected utility, and subjective expected utility, as well as competitive equilibrium (Nau and McCardle, 1991; Nau, 1999) . This paper provides some simple but hopefully enlightning examples showing that if a disequilibrium NPV alongside the CAPM is used for project valuation and decision making the principle of arbitrage is violated, as well as the property of value additivity. The analysis is confined to one period and it is supposed that a security market exists, described in Table 2 , where three securities are traded, numbered 1, 2, 3, the latter being a risk-free asset. The market is complete (the asset span equals the whole space 3 R ) and is assumed to be in equilibrium so that all assets lie on the Security Market Line (SML).
1 Three states of nature may occur and cash flows vary across these states according to the probabilities 0.5, 0.1, and 0.4 respectively. All numbers are rounded off to the second (or third) decimal. Table 1 collects the notations employed throughout the paper (the term 'asset' therein includes both projects and securities). The examples just rely on standard relations among variables. As for the CAPM, the value of any 
Note that the return rate of the project depends on the cost of the project so that the resulting NPV= As for arbitrage pricing technique, let t be a security lying on the SML such that
for some nonzero θ (t is then a twin security). We have that the value of l is the price it would have if it were traded:
Assume a decision maker faces project A whose cost is 738.48 and whose cash flows are 1200, 1000, 800 in the three states of nature respectively. Simple calculations show that the beta of A is the same as the beta of security 1 ( 077 
We have then Assume a CAPM-minded decision maker comes across an investment opportunity, say D, consisting of projects B and C (to be both selected or both rejected): Project B costs 926 and generates, at time 1, the certain sum 935; project C costs 64 and generates a random payoff equal to 466.4, 338.58, and −72.6 in the three respective states of nature. Given the security market of Table 2 and looking at eqs. (2) and (3) Finally, it is easy to see that additivity is not preserved in a standard CAPM-based valuation. Referring again to investment D, our CAPM-minded investor may aggregate the two projects' payoffs and sum them to compute the NPV. This boils down to saying that he is (framing and) valuing D as a single project. 2 
. In other terms, the standard CAPM-minded evaluator undergoes framing effects (see Magni, 2002, sec. 4) . By contrast, it is evident that additivity is not violated in arbitrage-based valuation: Modigliani and Miller's (1958) Proposition 1 just shows that the value of an asset (in particular, a firm) does not change irrespective of whether one sees it as a unique asset or as a two-asset (equity-and-debt) portfolio.
To sum up the results, this paper uses simple numerical counterexamples to show some anomalies in the use of disequilibrium NPV+CAPM for valuation and decision making. As an interesting by-product, deviations of decision makers' behaviors from the CAPM prescriptions, massively recorded in the current literature (e.g. Brigham, 1975; Gitman and Mercurio, 1982; Summers, 1987; Harvey, 2001, 2002; Jagannathan and Meier, 2002; Brounen, de Jong and Koedijk, 2004) should be seen under a new light: they are just violations of a benchmark that contradicts the principle of arbitrage and infringes the property of value additivity (see also Magni, 2009 ).
